Lelie or Gardner
Any suggestions?
non exspecto tuum consensum, ne intellectum quidem.

Hindsite is wonderful, aint it? Fact is Japan attacked America, end of story.
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark A. McLemore [mailto:everettmclemore@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 2:00 AM
To: letters@worldnetdaily.com
Cc: malkin@comcast.net
Subject: We've had it with Vox
It isn't so much that we disagree with Vox Day, it's just that we are getting tired of his Mensa, I'm-so-much-smarter-than-you, ad hominem, Bob Dole whatevers that he tries to pass off as reasoned debate. His rebuke of the Michelle Malkin internment thesis was a perfect example. Look, Roosevelt was afraid that what is happening now in Baghdad could have happened in Long Beach or Seattle, bombings, sabatoge, spying . . . If you examine America's two biggest wars, the Civil War and WWII, both of our wartime presidents made civil rights decisions that are severely questioned in hindsight by Mensa Armchair Quarterbacks. Now, 140 and 60 years later, Vox is wiser than Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Malkin combined. Wow. I'm voting for Malkin. And some of us score pretty well on that test too, Vox Populi.
Could you can Vox, please? He is insufferable and not all that informative or interesting. He reminds me of Bill O'Reilly. And what's with the haircut?
You are full of bluster, and low on reason. Every one of your supposed keen insights is only formed from historical hindsight. This, again, does not tell us if they made the "right" decision then, it only tells us what looks like the right decision NOW. Yes, we now know that America had a decisive advantage in industrial capacity, an advantage known then as well, but the planners in World War 2 did not know for certain what was in store for the Pacific coast of the US. Full invasion seemed unlikely, though distantly possible nevertheless. Industrial and military sabotage were very real possibilities, despite your baseless protestations to the contrary.
Malkin's work is probably full of holes, but what you and Eric Muller have offered is nothing but petty quibling here and there. Get to the subtance of her critique. The relative strengths of Japan's army and navy means little in that debate. If the Japanese population posed a threat or an impedience to victory, then the logic stands.
I also think you blow the internment reality out of proportion. The sad thing is it was unnecessary, not that it happened. Many non Japanese were interned for little reason and I don't see you comparing their plight to summary executions.
Like America posed no threat to Japan and Germany in 1941? All of you seem to taken the conclusion of World War to for granted. I don't.
With this morning's concession that the concern along the West Coast was Japanese spot raids and not a Japanese assault, she blows up the case for distinguishing between the Japanese threat to the West Coast and the German threat to the East Coast. And along with it, she blows up her claim that military necessity caused the government to take action against American citizens of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast while imposing no restrictions of any sort on American citizens of German ancestry on the East Coast (except insofar as they were dependents of German enemy aliens).
Mr. Vox has got his facts wrong. There is no question that in early 1942 our military leaders believed the risk of a Japanese attack on the West Coast was substantial. Henry Stimson, President Roosevelt's Secretary of War, stated in his autobiography that hit-and-run raids on the West Coast were "not only possible, but probable in the first months of the war, and it was quite impossible to be sure that the raiders would not receive important help from individuals of Japanese origin." That is enough to knock down Mr. Vox's argument, but if you are still not convinced, click below.
As I noted in my book and in an earlier blog entry, the concern among our military leaders about a Japanese attack on the West Coast was palpable even after Executive Order 9066 was signed in February 1942: After the daring Halsey-Doolittle raid in Tokyo in April, “[e]ight Japanese carriers had returned from their operations around southeastern Asia and the Japanese could release at least three of the eight for a retaliatory attack on the west coast without jeopardizing successes already achieved,” Army historian Stetson Conn recounted. Secretary of War Stimson “called in General Marshall and had a few earnest words with him about the danger of a Jap attack on the West Cst.” Stimson confessed that he was “very much impressed with the danger that the Japanese, having terribly lost face by this recent attack on them … , will make a counterattack on us with carriers.” General DeWitt’s superiors warned him to be on guard against a carrier attack at any time after May 10 and was informed that two more antiaircraft regiments were being sent to bolster the Los Angeles and San Francisco defenses.
Preceding the pivotal Battle of Midway, which the U.S. was alerted to thanks to another extraordinary communications intelligence operation that partially cracked JN-25, the Japanese navy’s operational code, the West Coast again prepared for the worst. Gen. Marshall informed General DeWitt that a Japanese attack with a chemical weapon might be expected; in mid-May, 350,000 gas masks (the entire available supply), protective clothing, and decontamination supplies were hastily shipped to the west coast. MID concurred with the Navy that a strong Japanese attack on American territory was in the offing before the end of the month, but it forecast that the “first priority” target of the attack would be “hit and run raids on West Coast cities of the continental United States supported by heavy naval forces.” Army intelligence held that such action was entirely within Japanese capabilities, considering the weakness of American naval power, and urged the concentration on the Pacific coast of all available continental air power to meet the threat.
The perception among our military leaders of risks to the West Coast in early 1942 is so well documented that I am surprised one of my critics would choose this line of attack. Did Mr. Vox even bother to read my book before slamming it? There was no analogous concern, by the way, about a major German or Italian attack on the East Coast. Neither Germany nor Italy had any aircraft carriers, whereas Japan's surface fleet was the best in the world. I will agree with Mr. Vox about one thing. The risk of a full-blown invasion of the U.S. mainland was low. This was known at the time. As I made clear in my book, the principal concern was spot raids on the West Coast (such as the one that occurred at Pearl Harbor), not a major invasion.
What would be interesting to review would be the various results of the war games played by the Naval War College in the 1920’s and 30’s which were used to develop Plan Orange (the contingency plans for war with Japan). Were the Naval planners of the that period projecting that the Japanese could invade the west coast of the USA?
The U.S. military really did develop a "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan--Red" in the 1920s and '30s, and it really did include provisions for an invasion of Canada by the United States.
The document was declassified in 1974, so this isn't really a new story, but there has been some hoopla about it lately. Concerns in some quarters notwithstanding, the whole thing was just a theoretical exercise in military planning. The brass would have made better use of their resources planning for a war with Germany, but that wasn't politically expedient. They reasoned that planning for unlikely wars was better than no planning at all. War Plan Red was never intended to be put into action except in the event of a war with the United Kingdom, an eventuality that everyone would agree was highly unlikely after about 1900.
In the color codes used at that time, "Red" referred not to Canada (that was "Crimson"), but to the United Kingdom. The proposed invasion of Canada wasn't an end in itself; it was just the easiest way to hurt the U.K. The plan called for quickly seizing the key port of Halifax to prevent British resupply; cutting communication between eastern and western Canada by capturing Winnipeg; securing bridgeheads near Buffalo, Detroit, and Sault Ste. Marie; and attacking Quebec overland from New England. If everything went according to plan, the U.S. military hoped to take the Great Lakes region and St. Lawrence valley before moving on the prairies and British Columbia. Later when U.S. naval forces were built up, they might be able to take Bermuda and Britain's Caribbean possessions on the road toward victory.
But there would be a price to pay for any such war. Planners essentially wrote off the Philippines, Guam, and Samoa if the British tried to take them early in the war. Planners also anticipated a possible invasion of the U.S. Pacific coast by an allied force from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.
Went all the way to the Gap of Rohan only to find there is no Gap in Rohan. Not even a Banana Republic. False advertising! - Arwen Undomiel
Everything going from bad to worse. Stop-off in Bree resulted in pick-up of disaffected and unshaven human who is obviously pervy hobbit-fancier, not that anyone listens to me. Insisted we all share bed in his room instead of going back to own perfectly nice quarters, then hung about all night most likely hoping for mad hobbit foursome under the sheets. Didn't happen, but did have to spend all night hanging on to Pippin's belt to prevent him from climbing right over Sam and onto Frodo. Does Pippin have death wish, or what? - Meriadoc Brandybuck
Have crossed orcs with goblin men in caverns below Isengard. V. tedious experience as orcs and goblin men most reluctant to breed, even with dinner and flowers. Next time will try something easier, such as breeding goblins and cheerleaders to create super-perky army that can travel by day and will not complain about pink uniforms. - Saruman
Two security-related incidents Saturday temporarily shut several Los Angeles international airport terminals and prevented planes taking off. Roads to and from airport blocked. No details given out. Rumor of small bomb that exploded in a terminal and injured 7 passengers not officially confirmed.
In “Al Qaeda Today, Centralized Strategic Decisions, Decentralized Operations”, examination of the terrorist network’s operational deployment revealed that its supreme leadership was losing direct control over target selection or the modalities of attacks decided by local branches, beyond general directives. The brutal school siege in Beslan, North Osettia, this week, was on example of a regional operation run by semi-autonomous regional or local affiliates over which the overall leadership has little control.
The school siege was masterminded by the Saudi wing of al Qaeda in Chechnya. Al Qaeda cells based in Iran are prone to manipulation by Tehran for political and military ends that are foreign to the movement’s objectives. Al Qaeda is also found in league with Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah in attempting to grab footholds in South Lebanon and Gaza Strip....
The first cracks are marring the once rock-smooth relations of unity and obedience binding the fundamentalist terror network’s various operational branches to the directives handed down by the top leaders.
This fragmentation of al Qaeda into ungovernable entities allied with outside forces, embedded in civilian populations and targeting other civilians, seriously hampers the efforts of counter-terror force to catch – let alone prevail over - all its widely-diffused fighting elements – certainly not by conventional military means.
33. Eddie Murphy's last season on "SNL." For my money, the most important "SNL" performer ever -- Eddie saved the show and made the most money afterwards. If you disagree, you're a racist and you hate blacks. End of story. (Sorry, this is the new way to argue points at Page 2. I'm just following instructions.)
Education: Get big cement trucks, fill them with linoleum cement mixed with potassium cyanide and maybe thumb tacks. Dump this salutary porridge into the faculty lounges of the teachers colleges, being sure that the scoundrels are still inside. Put up signs all around saying “Mutant Radioactive Cholera Site. Go Away.”
Catch all the employees of the Department of Education and paint “Deer” on them in red letters, and then tell suburban deer hunters that it’s open season. They won’t know the difference. Put a bounty on certified teachers. Personally I would not want the varmints stuffed over my fireplace, but we could make cat food from them.
Then—I know this is extreme, and people will say I’m heartless, and low down, and shameful as a truss ad--hire smart teachers. Demand work from the kids. Yes, it’s radical. The cries of the little monsters would tug at my heartstrings. Do it anyway. I’ll just suffer....
We won’t do these admirable things because (1) we don’t really care about education, (2) the education lobbies have influence in Washington, but voters don’t, and (3) minorities in a real schools system would fall even more obviously to the bottom. Disguising their shortcomings trumps teaching. Anyway, we probably don’t have enough linoleum cement.
Wars: Require that Congress declare war before we have one. Bring back the draft, exclusively for the fetid princelings of the Ivy Leagues. Give them to Marine Corps for training and, oh yes, please, let me watch. (Actually you could sell tickets to veterans to finance the program.) Strap their mothers onto the skids of deployable helicopters for two years each and feed them intravenously if need be. The ruling classes will see the uses of restraint.
Twenty hostage-takers killed, 10 of them Arabs – al Qaeda terrorists, some Saudis. About 13 escaped. At least one group attacked by soldiers in town.
As we leave the scripted conventions behind us, that is the uber-scenario that has locked into place, brilliantly engineered by the president of the United States, with more than a little unwitting assistance from his opponent.
It's from June 25, 1942, and reflects a conversation that King had with Roosevelt in Washington during a meeting of the Pacific War Council.... According to King, Roosevelt "said he thought the Japanese were foolish in thinking we would be much affected by these attacks they were making on the Pacific Coast. That it was not likely to alarm the people unduly but rather to strengthen their feeling of resistance. It was clear that he, himself, did not contemplate much in the way of an attack on our Pacific Coast but felt that the possession of the bases at Kiska [in the Aleutian chain] and elsewhere were to help to meet the situation that might develop between Japan and Russia."
VOX DAY ON MILITARY NECESSITY:
According to Vox Day, any military historian worth his or her salt could tell you that the top military brass back in early 1942 knew that a full-blown Japanese assault on the U.S. mainland was inconceivable--and that their reliance on that rationale for evicting Japanese Americans from the West Coast was therefore bogus.
I'm no military historian, so I can't really venture an opinion on whether or not Day is right about the forces and logistics that would have been necessary for a mainland assault. Perhaps others more expert than I might wish to respond.
Over at Vox Popoli, there is a strong argument that there was no reason for the U.S. to be afraid of a Japanese invasion, hence no need to worry about Japanese-Americans.
All very good in hindsight. After a number of years of assuming that the Japanese were too nearsighted to fly airplanes, and holding their military in considerable contempt, the United States was scared witless by the success of Japanese operations against the British and the Dutch. The success of Japanese troops bicycling in from the north to take "impregnable" Singapore, for example, was a real shocker. From "how can they fight white people" to "They are rolling all over Asia" may have caused an overreaction.
The U.S. built air bases on the east side of the Sierras to fight off Japanese forces. If this was strictly a matter of naval battles, why build them hundreds of miles from the coast? It would take more than an hour for fighter planes to get out over the water. It seems pretty clear to me that our government, perhaps overcautiously, believed that it was going to be fighting Japanese troops on the ground in California, Oregon, and Washington.
I don't really buy Malkin's argument completely, and I don't agree that the circumstances justified this mass arrest. I do think it is important to recognize the fear that Americans were operating under at the time. The fifth column actions of Japanese residents in China were probably known to the American government. It is possible that these similar actions by Japanese residents in the Philipines at the start of the war were known to our government as well. Perhaps a bit more willingness to acknowledge these issues--instead of portraying the internment in simplistic, moralistic terms, as many people have done over the years, myself included--might have prevented Malkin's book.
Dear sirs,
I have followed the debate between Ms Malkin and her various critics with some interest. However, it amazes me that the entire debate, bogged down in disputed minutae as it is, still manages to miss the only point that truly matters. Any reasonable perusal of the historical facts will allow even a casual observer to ascertain that there was never any danger of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast, and to see that this had to have been readily known to American military strategists at the time.
Ms Malkin is not a historian. She has, however, a perfect right to make an ass of herself by expressing whatever revisionist view of history that pleases her. But it seems that none of those criticizing her are military historians, because her case is absurd from the start.
In Ms Malkin's mind, the fact that some military bureaucrats and many ignorant civilians were afraid of "an imminent invasion" justifies the abrogation of the Constitution by President Roosevelt's executive order. Therefore, let's examine the facts, as they were known to the strategists of the day:
1. The Japanese Navy consisted of 176 ships.
2. The distance from Japan to the US West Coast is approximately 5,500 miles.
3. The length of the American coastline is 1,359 miles.
Does anyone dispute any of this? Very well. Some more facts.
1. The Overlord invasion required 4,600 ships and air supremacy
2. The distance from England to Normandy is approximately 22 miles.
3. The length of France's Atlantic Coastline is 1,875 miles.
4. Immediate access to the French ports of Caen, Le Havre and Cherbourg for reinforcement and resupply was the critical factor in deciding where the Normandy landings took place. Why? Because without reinforcement and resupply, even a very large landing force was doomed.
Furthermore:
1. The Kriegsmarine was slightly smaller than the Imperial Japanese Navy, but its 1,170 U-boats could have carried more troops than Japan's entire fleet, and more secretly.
2. The distance from the occupied French Coast to the American East Coast is only about 3,500 miles.
3. The Germans were significantly more active off the East Coast - sinking 14.7 times more merchant ships than the 27 sunk off the West Coast.
If one considers this easily researched data, one can only conclude that Ms Malkin is an utter ignoramus when it comes to matters military. Basic logic demonstrates that [the] likelihood and danger of a German invasion - however implausible - was far, far greater than a Japanese one. As the failure of the Anzio landing proves - an invasion that utilized almost twice the force that Japan had at its disposal even prior to Midway - it is not realistic to hypothesize that there was ever any credible danger of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast even if one is willing to fantasize that an island nation totally dependent upon seaborne imports for its raw materials would gamble its entire fleet on what would have amounted to a one-time suicide attack.
It is said that the amateur focuses on troops and generals, while the professional analyzes supply lines. Ms Malkin, it seems, does neither.
Furthermore, the fact that some military bureaucrats may have had genuine fears of a Japanese invasion demonstrates nothing but their incompetence and why the Constitutional limitations on government should never be lifted on the basis of hypothetical concerns perpetrated by government officials. This isn't hindsight, this is simply pointing out what was obvious even then.
As for fears of sabotage, the fact is that American industrial capacity so overwhelmed that of the enemy that Japanese saboteurs could have wiped out half the shipyards in California without it seriously affecting the course of the war. The fact that the USA managed to produce 150 carriers during the war, most of which were not needed and never saw action, to Japan's 15, tends to support this.
With best regards,
Vox Day
Universal Press Syndicate
I do not intend to make excuses for what Amnesty International calls: widespread and credible reports that Russian forces have been responsible for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including "disappearances", extrajudicial executions and torture, including rape.
But these actions by the Russian government in no way excuse attacks on non-combatants or taking hostages. Chechnyan terrorism has completely destroyed any sympathy that I had for their cause. If you want to portray yourself as heroic freedom fighters, you attack legitimate targets: combatants or political leaders, not children; you take prisoners, instead of executing them.
It looks to me as though what we are seeing in the Chechnyan terrorism is not victims of Russian abuses responding badly, but an al-Qaeda farm team--a group that does not believe that there are any legitimate restraints on their use of terror.
Actually, most of the 4,853 delegates and alternates to this convention were blissfully unaware of the little drama that played out briefly this week in an otherwise purposely uneventful convention. Even Bush's surrogates hardly mentioned the problem during their regular conference calls. But prominent Republicans, asking that their names not be used, expressed concern about the broader implications of the incident.
One senior senator with a flawless conservative voting record told me: "The troops in the field and their relatives at home must believe that an end is in sight. It would be really disastrous for them to think that there is no chance of winning this war." A prominent conservative governor, a particularly staunch Bush backer, said that the president had "stopped his own momentum" just as it seemed Sen. Kerry was in increasing trouble. The Democratic nominee was reeling, as another independent television ad used 33-year-old footage of Kerry saying he threw away his Vietnam War decorations.
The interruption of Bush's momentum conflicted with the meticulously planned national convention. Sen. John McCain delivered an effective argument for the war in Iraq, and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani explained the war on terror more effectively than the president has ever managed to do. Ironically, in a tightly managed convention, any slipup -- however small -- is magnified out of proportion.
That the mistake was viewed with alarm by the Bush political high command was signified Tuesday when the president was not content to correct himself to the American Legion. He rapidly moved to explain himself to Rush Limbaugh's huge listening audience. When the conservative talk show host promptly asked about the Lauer interview, the president replied: "Well, I appreciate you bringing that up. Listen, I should have made my point more clear about what I meant."
But why on earth didn't he make his point more clearly? In privately confessing that the president made a mistake, his own aides do not go deeper into why he erred. In the Lauer interview, Bush gives the impression that he was not concentrating on one of his final pre-convention interviews, acting as if he really were bored by the process. He obviously meant to say, as he did the next day, that "we may never sit down at a peace table." Instead, he hurried over and blurred the well-rehearsed explanation.
That little symbol [Michael] Moore made with his hand, at the convention on Monday night? I read that it was "L" for "loser." I really couldn't figure it out — it reminded me of that symbol that Filipinos made, all those years ago, in support of Cory Aquino.
A few minutes ago, Terry McAuliffe appeared on Sean's show. They went at it pretty hard, arguing about Vietnam and the war on terror. McAuliffe was stumped when Hannity asked him whether Kerry was lying when he said he spent Christmas in Cambodia.
I posted a little footage of McAuliffe's appearance, and of the impromptu press conference he gave immediately after, right in front of us, where he talked about the protests against the RNC. McAuliffe strikes me as an amiable rogue, much like his pal Bill Clinton. As Hannity was going into a commercial break, McAuliffe got in one last cheap shot: "How's your Halliburton stock doing?" To which Sean replied, "Not bad. How's Global Crossing doing?"
On a recent visit to Washington, President Harmid Karzai told me he expected that seven million out of the nine million eligible Afghan voters would register to vote. That seemed a vain hope, since nobody had the habit, and with opium growers and warlords roaming the precincts, voting would be risky.
What happened? So far, 9.9 million Afghans have registered, which is a little embarrassing, but the lust to get more than one registration card is only human to a populace that hid its oppressed womenfolk until the United States and its allies overthrew the Taliban. The Afghans don't take the right to vote for granted, as half of Americans do.
I know if steadfast, strong and resolute — and I say those words very seriously — it's less likely that your kids are going to live under the threat of al-Qaida for a long period of time. I can't tell you. I don't have any … definite end. But I tell you this, when we succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's the beginning of the end for these extremists. Because freedom is going to have a powerful influence to make sure your kids can grow up in a peaceful world. If we believe, for example, that you can't win, and the alternative is to retreat … I think that would be a disaster for your children.